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A . LetM be the space of all the τ×n matrices with pairwise distinct
entries and with both rows and columns sorted in descending order. If X =
(xij) ∈M and Xn is the set of the n greatest entries of X, we denote by ψj
the number of elements of Xn in the column j of X and by ψi the number of
elements of Ψ in the row i of X. If a new matrix X = (xij) ∈M is obtained
from X through a so defined elementary transformation (i.e. X ≤ X, the first
ν columns are left unchanged, and in the last (n − ν) columns it holds that
xij ≤ xuv if and only if xij ≤ xuv), then there is a relation of majorization
between (ψ1,ψ2, ...,ψτ ) and the corresponding (ψ 1,ψ 2, ...,ψ τ ) of X , and
between (ψ1,ψ2, ...,ψn) of X and (ψ1,ψ2, ...,ψn). This result can be applied
to the comparison of closed list electoral systems, providing a unified proof of
the standard hierarchy of these electoral systems according to whether they
are more or less favourable to larger parties.
1. I
Given two vectors a = (a1, a2, ..., aτ ) and a = (a1, a2, ..., aτ ) of Rτ such that
a1 ≥ a2 ≥ ... ≥ aτ and a1 ≥ a2 ≥ ... ≥ aτ , and with identical component sum
a1 + a2 + ...+ aτ = a1 + a2 + ...+ aτ =M , we say that a majorizes a when
a1 ≥ a1
a1 + a2 ≥ a1 + a2
...
a1 + a2 + ...+ aτ−1 ≥ a1 + a2 + ...+ aτ−1
holds, and denote this ordering by a a . This notation and terminology was
introduced in the classical [4]. The relation is transitive. Majorization has useful
applications (see [5]).
Let X = (xij) ∈M, whereM is the space of all the τ×n matrices with pairwise
distinct entries and with both rows and columns sorted in descending order (i.e.
xi1 > xi2 > ... > xin for i = 1, ..., τ and x1j > x2j > ... > xτj for j = 1, ..., n).
If Xn is the set of the n greatest entries of X, we denote by ψj the number of
elements of Xn in the column j of X and by ψ
i the number of elements of Ψ in
the row i of X. We consider the distribution of the n greatest entries of X among
the columns, (ψ1,ψ2, ...,ψn), and among the rows, (ψ
1,ψ2, ...,ψτ ). If a new matrix
X = (xij) ∈M is obtained from X through a so defined elementary transforma-
tion, we prove that there is a relation of majorization between (ψ1,ψ2, ...,ψτ ) and
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the corresponding (ψ 1,ψ 2, ...,ψ τ ) of X , and between (ψ1,ψ2, ...,ψn) of X and
(ψ1,ψ2, ...,ψn). We say that the matrix X is an elementary transformation of X
if X ≤ X, the first ν columns are left unchanged, and in the last (n− ν) columns
it holds that xij ≤ xuv if and only if xij ≤ xuv.
In both highest average and largest remainders closed list electoral systems, the
n greatest elements of a certain matrix are calculated. The theorem just mentioned
can be applied to the comparison of closed list electoral systems (or apportionment
methods), providing a unified proof of the standard hierarchy of these electoral
systems according to whether they are more or less favourable to larger parties.
2. C
In closed list electoral systems voters may only vote for closed lists proposed by
political parties (first-past-the-post is a particular case, with n = 1). We consider
a constituency with n seats, and let τ be the number of competing closed lists
(τ ≥ n ≥ 1). After counting, the final outcome of the election in the constituency
is the set E of elected candidates. A particular candidate is identified by the
party list p where they figure and their rank r in that list, where p = 1, .., τ and
r = 1, ..., n.
We introduce what we shall call the matrix of a closed list electoral system. As
a motivation, consider the usual table to allocate the seats by D’Hondt system, in
a numerical example (with n = 10) taken from [3]:
Votes (V ) (1/2) · V (1/3) · V (1/4) · V (1/5) · V Seats
Socialist Party 34,000 17,000 11,333 8,500 6,800 4
Center-right Party 25,000 12,500 8,333 3
Liberal Party 15,000 7,500 1
Green Party 12,000 6,000 1
Radical Right Party 10,000 5,000 1
Regionalist Party 4,000
TOTAL 100,000 10
This table, taking aside the last row and the last column, provides a 6× 5 matrix,
making up the first 5 columns of an instance of the matrix of the electoral system,
as we shall call it. The n largest entries of the matrix (here underlined) have been
worked out also; only the entries of the matrix that may be relevant for this purpose
are calculated.
In general, we can define a closed list electoral system through what we call its
matrix. Given a distribution of votes y = (y1, y2, ..., yτ ), where yi is the number
of votes obtained by party i , we shall introduce the matrix of the electoral system
(for y), Y = (yij), i = 1, ..., τ , j = 1, ..., n. The first column is always vector y,
and so yi1 := yi for every party i = 1, ..., τ . The n highest entries of the matrix are
found, and the corresponding candidates are those selected through the electoral
system to represent the constituency. Although the matrix of the electoral system
is not unique, we shall speak of the matrix of the electoral system (i.e. that one
used to define the electoral system).
Let us introduce matrix Y in the two most important cases: the highest average
systems and the largest remainders systems.
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• In the highest average systems the columns of Y are proportional to the first
column (the distribution of votes y), and the coefficients of proportionality are
provided by a sequence of divisors. Alternatively, we consider the following
parameters cr, r = 1, ..., n. For example, in the D’Hondt system (sequence of



















Let us take a particular highest average system. Given a distribution of votes
y = (y1, y2, ..., yτ ), where yi is the number of votes obtained by party i , we
introduce the matrix of the electoral system (for y), Y = (yij), i = 1, ..., τ ,
j = 1, ..., n. The first column is just vector y, and so yi1 := yi for every party
i = 1, ..., τ . The second column is yi2 := c1 · yi, the third one yi3 := c2 · c1 · yi,
the forth one yi4 := c3 · c2 · c1 · yi. In general,
yij := cj−1 · cj−2 · ... · c2 · c1 · yi , for i = 1, ..., τ , j = 2, ..., n(1)
• The largest remainders systems are based on a quota q defined from the total
number |B| of valid ballots cast; so q = |B| /(n + 1) is the Droop quota,
q = |B| /n is the Hare quota and q = |B| /(n + 2) is the Imperiali quota.
Roughly, each party is then awarded as many seats as it has full quotas, and
the remaining seats (if any) go to the parties with the highest remainders
(after the assigned quotas have been taken off). Alternatively, we define in
the following way the matrix of the electoral system:
yij := yi − (j − 1)q , for i = 1, ..., τ , j = 2, ..., n(2)
Note that every column of Y is the result of adding a constant to all the
elements of the first column.
Obviously to every row corresponds a party list, and to every column a rank in
a party list; thus the entry yij is assigned to the candidate in rank j of the list
of party i. In every case the n highest entries of the matrix are found, and the
corresponding candidates are selected to represent the constituency (usually not all
the entries of the matrix have to be calculated to determine the n highest among
them). Rules to break the possible ties are to be given with every electoral system.
Note that the two main sorts of closed list electoral systems, highest average and
largest remainders systems, represent the two simplest and more ”natural” ways
of deriving the matrix Y from vector y, the former multiplicative and the latter
additive.
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As a further example, consider the following table (not the usual one appearing
in books) to allocate the seats by the Hare largest remainders system, with the
same data as above by the D’Hondt system:
Votes (V) V−q V−2q V−3q Seats
Socialist Party 34,000 24,000 14,000 4,000 3
Center-right Party 25,000 15,000 5,000 3
Liberal Party 15,000 5,000 2
Green Party 12,000 2,000 1
Radical Right Party 10,000 0 1
Regionalist Party 4,000
TOTAL 100,000 10
This table, taking aside the last row and the last column, provides the first 4
columns of an instance of the matrix of the electoral system (only the relevant
entries are calculated).
3. M
If closed list electoral systems are considered, we can consider whether an elec-
toral system is more or less favourable to large or small parties. More precisely,
if n and τ are given, two electoral systems may be compared according to how
favourable they are to larger or smaller parties.
In this section we shall assume that n ≥ 2 and consider closed list electoral
systems satisfying the following: given two parties i and i , if the number of votes
of i is greater than the number of votes of i , then the number of seats assigned
to i will be greater than or equal to the number of seats assigned to i . If yi is
the number of votes obtained by party i and y := (y1, y2, ..., yτ ), we suppose that
y1 ≥ y2 ≥ ... ≥ yτ in order to avoid a cumbersome notation (without introducing
new symbols for this re-ordered vector). Moreover, ties appear rarely in practice
and the rules to break them are varied (by lot, criteria related with the age of the
candidates, etc). We shall not discuss these rules in our comparison of electoral
systems, and we take y1 > y2 > ... > yτ .
Firstly we need a precise definition of what it is to be understood by an electoral
system being more or less favourable to larger parties. We follow [6].
Definition 3.1. Let A and A’ be two closed list electoral systems. We consider
the distributions of votes y = (y1, y2, ..., yτ ) with y1 > y2 > ... > yτ and not leading
to ties in the matrices of A and A’. We say that the electoral system A is more
favourable to larger parties than the electoral system A’ if, for any such distribution
of votes y = (y1, y2, ..., yτ ),
a a
where ai is the number of seats obtained by party i with the electoral system A and
ai the number of seats obtained by party i with the electoral system A’.
Note that always
a1 + a2 + ...+ aτ = a1 + a2 + ...+ aτ = n(3)
The following relation is discussed in [1]. Given two vectors a = (a1, a2, ..., aτ )
and a = (a1, a2, ..., aτ ) of Rτ such that a1 ≥ a2 ≥ ... ≥ aτ and a1 ≥ a2 ≥ ... ≥ aτ ,
and with identical component sum a1 + a2 + ... + aτ = a1 + a2 + ... + aτ = M ,
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we say that a gives up to a if, for all i < j, ai ≤ ai or aj ≥ aj . This relation
implies majorization and it is not transitive (see [6]). The definition of a closed list
electoral system A’ giving up to a closed list electoral system A is the obvious one;
now in every comparison (from A’ to A) of a larger party i with a smaller party j
(i.e. i < j) it cannot happen that the larger party i loses seats and at the same
time the smaller party j gains seats.
Consider the matrix Y of the D’Hondt electoral system (cr = rr+1) and the
matrix Y of the Sainte-Laguë system (cr = 2r−12r+1 ). We can obtain Y from Y
stepwise, by a sequence of (n − 1) transformations. The first columns of both
matrices are equal (i.e. the vector y of the distribution of votes). Consider the




j+1), j = 1, ..., (n − 1). In a first step, we multiply the
columns 2 through n of Y by λ1 (and leave unchanged the first column). In a
second step, we multiply the columns 3 through n of the matrix resulting of step
1 by λ2 (and leave unchanged the first two columns)... In step j, we multiply the
columns (j+1) through n of the matrix resulting of step (j-1) by λj−1 (and leave
unchanged the first j columns). After (n-1) steps, we obtain matrix Y (see (1)).
We have applied an elementary transformation in every step, as defined below.
Consider now two largest remainders systems, determined by quotas q and q ,
with q < q , and let Y and Y be their matrices. We are to obtain Y from Y
stepwise, by a sequence of (n − 1) transformations. In a first step, we add the
constant (q − q ) to the columns 2 through n of Y (and leave unchanged the first
column). In a second step, we add again the constant (q − q ) to the columns
3 through n of the matrix resulting of step 1 (and leave unchanged the first two
columns)... In step j, we add the constant (q− q ) to the columns (j+1) through n
of the matrix resulting of step (j-1) (and leave unchanged the first j columns). After
(n-1) steps, we obtain matrix Y (see (2)). We have again applied an elementary
transformation in every step, as defined in the following paragraph. Recall thatM
is the space of all the τ × n matrices with pairwise distinct entries and with rows
and columns sorted in descending order.
Definition 3.2. Given X = (xij) ∈ M, we say that X = (xij) ∈ M is an
elementary transformation of X if the following two conditions hold for some integer
ν, 1 ≤ ν ≤ n:
(i) The first ν columns are left unchanged, i.e. xij = xij for i = 1, ..., τ and
j = 1, ..., ν.
(ii) In the last (n − ν) columns it holds that xij ≥ xij for i = 1, ..., τ and
j = ν + 1, ..., n, and also that xij ≤ xuv if and only if xij ≤ xuv , for i, u = 1, ..., τ
and j, v = ν + 1, ..., n.
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. Let X = (xij) ∈M and let Xn be the set of the n greatest entries
of X. We denote by ψj the number of elements of Xn in the column j of X and
by ψi the number of elements of Ψ in the row i of X. Let X = (xij) ∈ M be
an elementary transformation of X. The symbols Xn, ψj and ψ
i have the obvious
meanings. Then we have:
(i) (ψ1,ψ2, ...,ψn) (ψ1,ψ2, ...,ψn)
(ii) (ψ1,ψ2, ...,ψτ ) (ψ 1,ψ 2, ...,ψ τ )
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Proof. (i) Obviously ψ1+ψ2+ ...+ψn = ψ1+ψ2+ ...+ψn = n. We have to prove:
ψ1 ≤ ψ1
ψ1 + ψ2 ≤ ψ1 + ψ2
...
ψ1 + ψ2 + ...+ ψn−1 ≤ ψ1 + ψ2 + ...+ ψn−1
Let Ψ ⊆ {(i, j) : i = 1, ..., τ , j = 1, ..., n} be the set of the coordinates of the n
greatest entries of X and let Ψ ⊆ {(i, j) : i = 1, ..., τ , j = 1, ..., n} be the set of the
coordinates of the n greatest entries ofX . On the one hand, {(i, j) ∈ Ψ : i = 1, ..., τ , j = 1, ..., ν} ⊆
{(i, j) ∈ Ψ : i = 1, ..., τ , j = 1, ..., ν}, where ν is as in Definition 3.2. Thus ψj ≤ ψj
for j = 1, ..., ν. Therefore the first ν inequalities hold. On the other hand,
{(i, j) ∈ Ψ : j = ν + 1, ..., n} ⊆ {(i, j) ∈ Ψ : j = ν + 1, ..., n}, and ψj ≥ ψj for j =
ν + 1, ..., n. Also
(ψ1 + ...+ ψν) + (ψν+1 + ...+ ψn) = n = (ψ1 + ...+ ψν) + (ψν+1 + ...+ ψn)
(ψν+1 + ...+ ψn)− (ψν+1 + ...+ ψn) = (ψ1 + ...+ ψν)− (ψ1 + ...+ ψν)
(ψν+1 − ψν+1) + ...+ (ψn − ψn) = (ψ1 + ...+ ψν)− (ψ1 + ...+ ψν)
We consider now the inequality µ, with µ > ν. We have
(ψν+1 − ψν+1) + ...+ (ψµ − ψµ) ≤ (ψ1 + ...+ ψν)− (ψ1 + ...+ ψν)
and it follows that
ψ1 + ...+ ψν + ...+ ψµ ≤ ψ1 + ...+ ψν + ...+ ψµ
(ii) Clearly ψ1 + ψ2 + ...+ ψτ = ψ 1 + ψ 2 + ...+ ψ τ = n. We have to prove:
ψ1 ≥ ψ 1
ψ1 + ψ2 ≥ ψ 1 + ψ 2
...
ψ1 + ψ2 + ...+ ψτ−1 ≥ ψ 1 + ψ 2 + ...+ ψ τ−1
Note that ψ1 = max {j : (1, j) ∈ Ψ , j = 1, ..., n} and ψ 1 = max {j : (1, j) ∈ Ψ , j = 1, ..., n}.
Also ψβ = 0 for β > α := ψ
1, and thus, from (i), we have
n = ψ1 + ψ2 + ...+ ψα ≤ ψ1 + ψ2 + ...+ ψα
Therefore ψ1 + ψ2 + ... + ψα = n, and ψβ = 0 for β > α. We conclude that
ψ 1 ≤ α = ψ1. In order to prove the inequality γ, with γ > 1, let us consider the
matrices X and X obtained eliminating the first (γ − 1) rows of X and X , re-
spectively. The notations Ψ, ψj and Ψ , ψj have the obvious meanings. Now ψ
γ =
max j : (1, j) ∈ Ψ , j = 1, ..., n and ψ γ = max j : (1, j) ∈ Ψ , j = 1, ..., n . Be-
sides, ψβ = 0 for β > α := ψ
γ , and ψ1 + ψ2 + ... + ψα = ψ1 + ψ2 + ... + ψn =
n− (ψ1 + ψ2 + ...+ ψγ−1). Also, applying (i) to X and X , we have
ψ1 + ψ2 + ...+ ψα ≤ ψ1 + ψ2 + ...+ ψα
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Therefore n− (ψ1+ψ2+ ...+ψγ−1) ≤ ψ1+ψ2+ ...+ψα. Since ψ1+ψ2+ ...+ψn =
n− (ψ 1 + ψ 2 + ...+ ψ γ−1), it follows that
ψα+1 + ...+ ψn = n− (ψ 1 + ψ 2 + ...+ ψ γ−1)− (ψ1 + ψ2 + ...+ ψα) ≤
≤ (ψ1 + ψ2 + ...+ ψγ−1)− (ψ 1 + ψ 2 + ...+ ψ γ−1)
The elements of the first row of Ψ are either in the columns 1, ...,α or in the
columns (α+ 1), ..., n, and consequently
ψ γ ≤ ψγ + (ψ1 + ψ2 + ...+ ψγ−1)− (ψ 1 + ψ 2 + ...+ ψ γ−1)
We conclude that ψ 1 + ψ 2 + ...+ ψ γ ≤ ψ1 + ψ2 + ...+ ψγ .
The following Corollary is immediate from Theorem 3.1 (ii). In order to prove


















which follow from the simple fact that the quotient of two consecutive positive
numbers, h/(h+ 1), increases (strictly) as h increases.
Corollary 3.2. (i) Among the highest average closed list systems, from the most
favourable to larger parties to the least favourable, the order is:
Imperiali, D’Hondt, Sainte-Laguë, Danish.
(ii) Among the largest remainders closed list systems, the smaller the quota, the
more favourable to larger parties.
Following approaches different from ours, statement (i) was proved in [1] and
statement (ii) in [2], in both cases for the ”give up to” relation mentioned above.
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